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The Tentative Settlement Class and Class Action Suits
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
Judicial approval of the creation of two tentative plaintiff classes
for the settlement of a series of individual and class actions known
as the "plumbing fixture" cases1 raises the possibility that tentative
settlement classes may be used in other types of class actions. The
plumbing :fixture cases involved over three hundred actions by
builder-owners, public bodies, wholesalers, retailers, and plumbing
and general contractors who alleged that the defendants violated
antitrust laws with respect to the manufacture and sale of plumbing
:fixtures. After a great deal of litigation2 two proposed settlements
were reached, each providing for the establishment of a temporary
class for the purpose of settlement only.8 The settlements were conditionally approved, and over 243,000 individuals were sent notice.4
At the final hearing, the temporary settlement class was designated
final and permanent, and the proposed compromise was given judicial endorsement.6
This Note will examine the potential utility of a tentative settlement class (TSC) in suits initiated under title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. The advantages and disadvantages of the TSC will be
discussed in the context of analyzing whether the use of a TSC is
valid under rules 23(a) and 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The discussion of the merits of the TSC in the title VII
context will illustrate the problems inherent in the use of a tentative
class for encouraging settlements of any class action.
The enactment of title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act0 made it
illegal to discriminate with respect to employment on the basis of an
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. As originally
1. Ace Heating &: Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30 (3d Cir. 1971); Phila•
delphia Housing Authority v. American Radiator &: Standard Sanitary Corp., 322 F,
Supp. 834 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Radiator &:
Standard Sanitary Corp., 323 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
2. See cases cited in note 1 supra. Other opinions dealing with various aspects
of the litigation are reported at 50 F.R.D. 13 (E.D. Pa. 1970); 309 F. Supp. 1057
(E.D. Pa. 1969); 294 F. Supp. 1148 (E.D. Pa. 1969); 291 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Pa. 1968);
269 F. Supp. 540 (E.D. Pa. 1967). Indeed, over three hundred actions were pending
at the time of the compromise. Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Radiator
&: Standard Sanitary Corp., 323 F. Supp. 364, 365 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
3. Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Radiator &: Standard Sanitary
Corp., 323 F. Supp. 364, 372 (E.D. Pa. 1970). Settlement Order Number One provided
for the establishment of a national temporary class of wholesalers with claims against
the settling defendants. A second compromise created a national class of plumbing and
general contractors. 323 F. Supp. at 366, 372.
4. Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 322 F. Supp. 834, 836 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
5. Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American_ Radiator &: Standard Sanitary
Corp., 322 F. Supp. 834, 840 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
6. Pub. L No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to
2000e-15 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-to 2000e-15 (Supp. II, 1972)).
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structured, the Act contemplated that charges of unlawful discrimination in employment would be filed with the Equal Employment
Opportunities Commission (hereinafter referred to as the EEOC),
the agency established to implement the prohibitions of the Act.7
Upon the filing of a charge the Commission was to conduct an investigation to determine whether there was reasonable cause to believe that the charge was true. If reasonable cause was found, the
EEOC was under a duty to attempt to eliminate the unlawful practice through informal conciliation and persuasion.8 If the EEOC
failed to conciliate, the individual could file suit on his own.9
Unfortunately, this scheme did not accomplish effectively the
aims of the Act. Private parties frequently failed to bring actions in
the courts after the EEOC had been unable to obtain a voluntary
settlement10 and, as a result, there was insufficient pressure on employers to settle disputes.11
The passage of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 197212
broadened considerably the authority of the Commission to obtain
corrective action in eliminating discrimination. The EEOC was given
power to initiate civil actions in federal court.13 Thus, under present
law, once charges are filed with the EEOC, the agency may (1) dismiss
the charges if it finds no reasonable cause to believe them, (2) fail to
act for a period of 180 days, (3) find reasonable cause and institute
suit,14 or (4) reach a conciliation.15 If the agency dismisses the charges
7. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1970), as amended,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (Supp. II, 1972).
8. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1970), as amended,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (Supp. II, 1972).
9. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 707, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1970), as amended, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (Supp. II, 1972).
.
10. See Hearings on S. 245J Before the Subcomm~ on Labor of the Senate Comm.
on Labor and Public Welfare, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 38, 40 (1969).
William H. Brown m, chairman of the EEOC, noted that private suits had been
initiated in less than ten per cent of those cases in which the EEOC had been
unable to obtain voluntary settlement. Id.
11. For example, in fiscal year 1972, the last fiscal year before the implementation
of the 1972 amendments, the EEOC found reasonable cause to assert unlawful discrimination against 1,390 employers. Settlement was attempted with respect to 792 of
these employers; only 268 complete or partial successes were recorded. 7 EEOC ANN.
REP. 52-53 (1973). Cf. M. SOVERN, LEGAL REsnwNrs ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 80 (1966): "The experience of state and local agencies shows that impotence
will frequently be met with intransigence, that conciliation works best when compulsion
is waiting in the wings."
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-15 (Supp. II, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
to § 2000e-5 (1970).
13. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(£)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (Supp. II, 1972).
14. It is not clear whether the EEOC's right to sue on a charge expires 180 days
after the charge is filed. The Fourth Circuit, the only court of appeals that has ruled
on the question, recently held that it does not. EEOC v. Cleveland Mills, excerpted in
43 U.S.L.W. 2092 (Sept. 10, 1974).
15. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(£)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (Supp. II, 1972).
In cases involving a state law that parallels the federal law, the EEOC will defer
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or fails to act for 180 days, the private party may institute suit on
his o·wn.16
Even under the 1972 amendments potential defendants may not
have sufficient incentive to resolve title VII complaints quickly. A
judgment, and even litigation, may still be years away,11 particularly
where the discrimination is not blatant, or when there are interpretive difficulties surrounding the act. Thus, despite the necessary step
instituted by the 1972 amendments, speedy resolution of employment
discrimination problems is not yet a reality.
The tentative settlement class may present a useful alternative in
situations in which private class actions may be maintained.18 The
TSC differs from the class in a class action suit primarily in matters
of timing. Whereas the usual class must be formed and approved by
the court before the suit may proceed as a class action,1 9 the TSC is
formed without judicial scrutiny at the same time that the parties
institute settlement negotiations. The court is then asked to approve
a "package" consisting of the TSC and of the proposed settlement.20
The TSC is "tentative" in the sense that the employer has the right
to object to its breadth in the event that the court does not approve
the settlement. The class in a more typical class action offers no such
flexibility; the parties are bound by the class determination once the
suit is allowed to proceed as a class action. The TSC also permits a
broadening of the plaintiff class so that the potential claims of all
employees of the defendant-employer are represented, including
to the state proceeding for 60 days after the initial complaint. 42 U,S.C. § 2000e-5(d)
(Supp. II, 1972). See also Sape &: Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employ•
ment opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEo. WASH. L REv. 824, 863-64 (1972).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (Supp. II, 1972).
17. The EEOC suffers from a considerable work backlog. For example, as of
June 30, 1971, 32,000 cases were backlogged. Processing a case may require 18 to 24
months. Hearings on S. 2515, S. 2617, and H.R. 1746 Before the Subcomm. on Labor
of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1971). After
the EEOC finds reasonable cause another 6 months usually has passed before Jt seeks
conciliation. 118 CONG. REc. S.1800 (daily ed. Feb. 15, 1972) (remarks of Senator Javits).
Court delay may add another 18 months or more. Id.
18. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
An analogous all party settlement procedure could be incorporated into EEOC
settlement negotiations, but many of the advantages of the procedure are lost once
it is placed within the EEOC framework. The settlement may not foreclose other
parties from bringing suit over the same employment practice, Reed v. Arlington
Hotel Co., 476 F.2d 721, '724-25 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 854 (1973);
Williams v. New Orleans S.S. Assn., 341 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. La. 1972), and the possibility of speedy settlement would be diminished by ovenvorked bureaucratic
structures.
19. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(l) (see text preceding note 94 infra); 1 (Pt. 2) J, MoonE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE 1J 1.40 (pt. 1) {2d ed. 1973).
20. Court approval of class action settlements is required by FED. R. CIV. P, 28(e):
"A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the
court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all
members of the class in such manner as the court directs."
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claims not included in the original complaint. The employer seeks
an all-encompassing class because he desires one lump settlement that
will free him from the possibility of additional claims.
Procedurally, the TSC would be formed after the filing of suit,21
upon the defendant's motion that all employees with potential title
VII claims be included in any settlement discussion.22 The suit, however, would remain under the control of the original plaintiffs. The
parties would negotiate a final settlement package that would include
an amendment of the pending suit to encompass the broadest possible
spectrum of interested parties. For example, a class might be composed of all members of racial or ethnic minorities, including but not
limited to black, Spanish-surnamed, Oriental, and Indian Americans
who have been employed, are employed, or may be employed by the
defendant at ABC plant, and who have been, are presently, or may
in the future be adversely affected by past or present employment
practices of the defendant that discriminated on the basis of race,
color, or national origin.23
The package would also require that all prior actions based on
the alleged discrimination, including any charges pending before the
EEOC, be dropped if the settlement is approved. In addition, the
plaintiffs would agree not to file new actions based on past employer
conduct.24 Finally, the defendant would not admit liability. The
mere fact that the defendant offers to settle cannot be used against
him as evidence of an admission of liability.25
After the agreement is consummated the requisite notice26 would
be sent to all members of the prospective class, describing the litigation, the defendants, and the composition of the proposed class.
Recipients would be advised of the final approval date27 and warned
that they may be bound by the terms of the agreement.
21. The TSC could be formed at any stage of the settlement process, but the
employer's incentive to agree to or initiate the TSC is significantly greater when a
court suit is imminent. The most likely time for TSC formation is after the EEOC
dismissal or failure to act, at which time the employee(s) will have instituted or will
be contemplating court action.
22. This discussion presupposes that the employer can be induced to settle out
of court. Any settlement, incorporating a TSC or otherwise, may be made impossible
by the employer who insists on lengthy and costly court battles. The employer
incentive to negotiate a TSC is discussed in the text accompanying notes 28-32 infra.
23. As noted above, this class would be created for the purpose of settlement
only, and without prejudice to a de novo class determination in future litigation
if the settlement or the class is not approved by the court.
24. Also, judicial approval of the settlement is res judicata as to those claims
settled. See Stevenson v. International Paper Co., 352 F. Supp. 230 (S.D. Ala. 1972)
(decisions issued in a prior class action held to bar any new decision on those same
issues in a suit against a paper manufacturer for alleged discrimination).
25. C. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 274 (2d ed. 1972).
26. Notice is required under FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).
27. The approval date would be the date set by the court for a hearing to
determine whether the settlement will be approved. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2){A);
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The strength of the tentative settlement class proposal rests with
the increased incentive to the defendant to settle quickly. The TSC
has its greatest potential where private claims are pending and the
defendant-employer fears the filing of other claims. As a quid pro quo
for settling all actual and potential claims the defendant-employer is
assured that he faces no further liability. The defendant, however,
must believe that the total cost of the compromise will be significantly less than the total cost of litigating all the claims made by all
actual and potential plaintiffs. Such a belief might be well-founded.
Civil rights litigation is costly; 28 even ten years ago the cost of a trial
in a federal district court with an appeal to a circuit court of appeals
and an application to the Supreme Court was estimated at from
15,000 to 18,000 dollars. 29 Moreover, the defendant faces the risk of
being forced to pay the plaintiff's attorney's fees, 30 which can be quite
sizeable/11 To the anticipated litigation costs must be added the value
of all claims discounted by what the defendant believes to be his probability of prevailing in court. This total is the base figure for the
TSC agreement. The employer benefits to the extent that the settlement figure is lower.
Another advantage for the employer is that he will be able to
ascertain at an early stage the total extent of his liability. He benefits
from a greater cost accounting certainty, which will ease his budgeting
tasks, and his business is freed from the potential loss of reputation
and clientele that may accompany a long series of discrimination
suits.
Finally, the defendant's litigation posture has not been damaged
if the final settlement is not approved, provided the court upholds
the provision of the agreement under which the defendant is entitled
to de novo consideration of the breadth of the class.32
Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp,,
322 F. Supp. 834, 836 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
28. Comment, Allowance of Attorney Fees in Civil Rights Actions, 7 COLUlll,

J.

L.

& Soc. PROB. 381, 381 (1971).

29. 110 CONG. R.Ec. 6541 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey).
30. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6k (Supp. II, 1972).
31. See, e.g., Clark v. American Marine Corp., 320 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. La. 1970),
afjd. per curiam, 437 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1971), where attorney's fees of $20,000 were
awarded to the plaintiffs. EEOC court action, it should be noted, does not result
in an award of attorney's fees to the plaintiffs unless they choose to intervene in
the EEOC action. Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 706(k), (f)(l), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c-6(k), (f)(l)
(Supp. II, 1972).
32. Compare the "plumbing fixture cases," discussed in notes 1-2 supra and
accompanying text, with West Virginia v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), afjd., 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971),
In Pfizer, 66 civil actions were filed claiming violations of antitrust laws in
connection with the sale of antibiotics. A settlement was reached and an order filed
to administer the settlement. The plaintiffs were divided by the order into two
groups: (1) governmental bodies and (2) wholesalers and retailers. 314 F. Supp. at 723,
For the governmental bodies a "temporary national class action" was established.
A member could accept the offer of settlement by joining the national class,
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The use of a tentative settlement class also aids the implementation of the Civil Rights Act in that expeditious settlements effectuating changes in employment practices further the EEOC's goal of
restructuring employment policies that adversely affect large numbers of people.33 Settlement of title VII cases, however, may hinder
development of the law in the area. There is evidence that Congress
aut~orized private litigation to encourage the judicial enunciation
of principles on employment practices as well as to facilitate the
compensation of aggrieved parties.31'
Courts generally favor settlement over litigation,35 however, if the
settlement is "fair, reasonable, and adequate."36 Court resources,
which have come under increasing strain,37 are freed. Furthermore,
settlement allows plaintiffs to receive payment without years of expensive litigation. Previous experience reveals that without assistance
many plaintiffs fail to pursue their discrimination claims.38 Although
the provisions allowing awards of attorney's fees39 and authorizing
the EEOC to bring court actions40 increase the likelihood that redress
will be sought, the tentative settlement class may avoid long litigation delays and the uncertainty of recovery,41 and thus increase the
incentive for plaintiff action.
exclude himself from the national class but accept the settlement offer, or reject
the settlement offer and exclude himself from the national class. 314 F. Supp. at 723.
The private wholesalers and retailers who accepted the settlement offer combined
their claims into a "consolidated wholesaler-retailer class action." 314 F. Supp. at
724. The class was established prior to court consideration of the adequacy of the
compromise. In the plumbing fixture cases, however, the class determination hinged
on a final approval of the settlement. There is little difference if the settlement is
consummated and the compromise approved. If the court does not approve the compromise, however, the Pfizer procedure would leave the employer-defendant with a
very broad class action suit to contest. Arguments on the extent of the injury and
on the proper size of the class may be irrevocably sacrificed. In the TSC the parties
stipulate that a settlement failure will not require the defendants to forego arguing
against the breadth and scope of the class.
33. 7 EEOC ANN. REP. 34 (1973).
34. George Sape, Deputy Director of the Office of Congressional Affairs of the
EEOC, and Thomas Hart, professional staff member of the House Subcommittee on
Labor, have argued that Congress preserved the individual right to sue because of
its conviction that aggressive individual litigants would contribute to developing the
law under the new statute. Sape & Hart, supra note 15, at 879-80.
35. West Virginia v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1085-86 (2d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971); Florida Trailer & Equip. Co. v. Deal, 284 F.2d 567,
571 (5th Cir. 1960). See note 41 infra and accompanying text.
36. West Virginia v. Charles Pfizer &: Co., 314 F. Supp. 710, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
afjd., 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
37. See, e.g., Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat
to the Function of Review and the National µw, 82 HARV. L. REv. 542 (1969).
38. See note IO supra and accompanying text.
39. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
40. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
41. See Zerkle v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., 52 F.R.D. 151, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1971):
"[A] bird in the hand is to be preferred to the flock in the bush and a poor settle-
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A fundamental tension, however, will exist benveen the original
plaintiffs and the interests of those they purportedly represent. The
original plaintiffs, who would retain control of the suit, may be willing to compromise the interests of the class as a whole, either because
of a legitimate belief that others' rights to redress are uncertain or
because the controlling plaintiffs are operating solely in their own
interest. However, similar dangers are present whenever a class action
is settled. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was designed to protect against such dangers by requiring close judicial
supervision of settlement agreements in class action suits. Arguably,
the broad nature of the TSC aggravates the potential for abuse and
makes the protective provisions of rule 23 inadequate. The questions
thus arise: Does the tentative settlement class concept fall within the
settlement procedures permitted by the rule, and, if so, does the
rule offer sufficient protection against potential abuse?
The answer to the first question depends upon whether the TSC
meets the requirements for a class action prescribed by rule 23(a)
and whether it falls within one of the several categories for the maintenance of class actions established by rule 23(b).
Judicial construction of rule 23(a) has imposed the preliminary
requirement that there in fact be a "class."42 Class existence is a
question of fact to be determined according to the circumstances of
each case.43 Although it may be said that discrimination by its nature
is an injury to a class of persons,44 the courts will not certify a group
as a class unless it can be described with precision sufficient to allow
the court administratively to determine whether a given individual
is a member.45 A court has broad discretion in defining a class, however.46 If the plaintiffs' definition is unacceptable the court may either
reconstrue the complaint or redefine the class to permit the class
ment to a good litigation." See also Fox, Settlement: Helping Lawyers Fulfill Their
Responsibility, 53 F.R.D. 129-30 (1971).
42. 7 C. WRIGHT &: A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1'760, at 579
(1972).
43. 7 C. WRIGHT&: A. MILLER, supra note 42, § 1760, at 579, citing Chaffee v. Johnson,
229 F. Supp. 445 (S.D. Miss. 1964), affd. on other grounds, 352 F.2d 514 (5th Cir 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 956 (1966).
44. Cf. Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184, 186 (M.D. Tenn. 1966):
"Racial discrimination is by definition a class discrimination. If it exists, it applies
throughout the class."
45. See DeBremaecker v. Short, 433 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1970) (class action on behalf
of the "residents of this state" active in the "peace movement" complaining of harass•
ment by members of the city police department dismissed because of indefiniteness
of the plaintiff class). See also Lopez Tijerina v. Henry, 48 F.R.D. 274 (D.N.M. 1969)
(task of applying class definitional factors to each state resident held to be infeasible).
46. City of New York v. International Pipe &: Ceramics Corp., 410 F.2d 295, 298
(2d Cir. 1969).

June 1974]

Notes

1469

action to proceed,47 or it can allow the plaintiff to limit the class by
amending his complaint.4 S
Assuming that an appropriate class may be defined, the TSC must
meet the four prerequisites of rule 23(a):
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of
law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.

There should be little problem meeting the first two requirements. The broad scope of the tentative settlement class, which may
include all parties aggrieved or who may be aggrieved in the future
by the defendant's past conduct, should make joinder of all members "impracticable." 49 A variety of factors, however, such as the
nature of the action, the size of the individual claims, and the location of the members of the class may influence the resolution of this
issue in a particular case.50
The second requirement-that there be "questions of law or fact
common to the class"..:_will be met because the discriminatory
character of the defendant's conduct will be a common issue, even
though individual class members may have suffered different effects
from the alleged discrimination and different groups may have adverse interests in obtaining a settlement.51
There may be more difficulty satisfying the requirements of rules
23(a)(3) and (a)(4) because of the breadth of the tentative class.52
Rule 23(a)(3) provides that "the claims or defenses of the representative parties must he typical of the claims or defenses of the class."
This has been interpreted as requiring that the representative's in47. Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 492 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rrod. on other grounds,
438 F .2d 825 (2d Cir. 1970).
48. Cf, FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d)(4).
49. But see Tolbert v. Western Elec. Co., 5 CCH EMPL. PRAc. DEC, 11 7989 (N.D.
Ga. 1972); Chavez v. Rust Tractor Co., 2 CCH EMPL. PRAc. DEC. 11 10,1'71 (D.N.M.
1969).
50. 7 C. WRIGHT &: A. MILLER, supra note 42, § 1762, at 600.
51. Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184, 186 (M.D. Tenn. 1966); 7 C.
WRIGHT &: A. MILLER, supra note 42, § 1763, at 608. See also Johnson v. Georgia
Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1124-25 (5th Cir. 1969); Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 49 F.R.D. 184, 189 (E.D. La. 1968); Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327,
329-30 (M.D. Ala. 1966), atfd. per curiam, 390 U.S. 333 (1968).
The requirement of rule 23(a)(2) has been held superfluous because of a similar
requirement under rule 23(b). Vernon J. Rocl<ler & Co. v. Graphic Enterprises, Inc.,
52 F.R.D. 335, 340 n.9 (D. Minn. 1971); 3B J. MooRE, supra note 19, 11 23.06--1, at
23-301. Most courts do not expend much energy determining whether it is satisfied.
7 C. WRIGHT&: A. MILLER, supra note 42, § 1763, at 604.
52. See Harvey v. International Harvester Co., 56 F.R.D. 47, 48 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
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terest not conflict with the interests of those he claims to represent.Gil
The full meaning of this provision is put into perspective when
viewed together with the final requirement of rule 23(a),G4 which
mandates that "[t]he representative parties ... fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class." The use of the word "protect" is
significant; the binding effect of a judgment foreclosing rights of absentee parties imposes a heavy responsibility on the court and on the
class representative.65 Whether representative parties adequately protect the nonparty plaintiffs is a factual issue to be disposed of by the
trial court.56
,
The unique nature of the tentative settlement class makes adequacy of representation troublesome. The Manual for Complex Litigation lists several reasons why tentative settlement classes contravene
the policy of rule 23.57 The criticisms suggest that the controlling
plaintiffs are unable adequately to serve the interests of the remainder of the class; also, the effort required to ensure that the class
is equitably composed frustrates the goal of speedy settlement: "[A]ppropriate membership of the class and the identity of the members
cannot be determined in the absence of an opportunity for hearing
and judicial findings of fact and conclusions of law. Nor can there
be any assurance that the tentative class will be composed of interests
which are not conflicting." 58 In addition, the question of representation is complicated by the fact that those involved in the unofficially
negotiated formation of the tentative class are self-appointed.Go As the
court noted in Ace Heating &- Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., "...
when the settlement is not negotiated by a court-designated class
representative the court must be doubly careful in evaluating the
fairness of the settlement to plaintiff's class." 60
53. Rakes v. Coleman, 318 F. Supp. 181, 190 (E.D. Va. 1970); C. WRIGHT,
FEDERAL COURTS § 72, at 307 n.14 (2d ed. 1970); Doneland, Prerequisites to a Class
Action Under New Rule 2J, 10 B.C. IND. &: CoM, L. REv. 527, 534 (1969).
54. Doneland, supra note 53, at 534.
55. Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 493 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), revd. on other
grounds, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1970): "[The nonparty members] may find themselves
bound even though they were not actually aware of the proceeding. In such circumstances, the contention that adequate representation is lacking becomes weighty and
the 'interests of the affected persons must be carefully scrutinized to assure due
process of law for the absent members,'" quoting Carroll v. American Fed, of Musi•
cians, 372 F.2d 155, 162 (2d Cir. 1967), vacated, 391 U.S. 99 (1968).
56. Flaherty v. McDonald, 178 F. Supp. 544, 551 (S.D, Cal. 1959),
57. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (pt. 1) § 1.46 at 43-45 (West ed. 1973) [hereinaner MANUAL]. The Manual is published under the auspices of the Federal Judicial
Center, and has a Board of Editors composed of federal judges. Id. at iii-xiv. The
Federal Judicial Center was established by Congress in 1967 to improve federal
judicial administration through research and planning; the Center must regularly
report to the Judicial Conference of the United States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 620-29 (1970).
58. MANUAL, supra note 57, § 1.46, at 43-44.
59. MANuAL, supra note 57, § 1.46, at 44.
60. 453 F.2d 30, 33 (3d Cir. 1971) (emphasis added).
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In determining whether there is adequate representation as required under rules 23(a)(3) and (a)(4), one commentator suggests
that a court consider (1) whether the interests of the named parties
are coextensive with the interests of the other members of the class;
(2) whether their interests are antagonistic in any way to the interests
of those whom they represent; (3) the proportion of those named
compared to the total membership of the class; and (4) any other
facts that might be relevant to deciding the question.61
The first two factors may have identical meanings.62 The former
has been seen as embodying the requirement of typicality of claims
of rule 23(a)(3),63 and some courts feel that typicality simply paraphrases the requirement that the representative not have interests
that conflict with those of the class.64 In any event, these requirements
do not mean that the interests of the representatives must be identical
to those of each member of the class. The representatives simply must
share common objectives and legal or factual positions.65 Settlement
class members would have common interests in ending employment
discrimination and receiving redress for injuries, so it may be argued
that these requirements are met. 66 Still, the establishment of an
affirmative action hiring quota, for example, may benefit one group
at the expense of another, particularly if the party plaintiffs are all
of one ethnic group and the nonparty plaintiffs of another. The settlement might not only compromise the latter's interests but foreclose
any later pursuit of relief. In an analogous case67 a court found that
the class representatives' motive for commencing the action-obtaining rescission of a contract-made them less likely to accept a cash
settlement that would be in the best interest of the nonparty class
members; thus representation was held inadequate.
Settlement is a preferred means of disposition, however, and a
federal judge has an affirmative duty to advance a case to a just, inexpensive, and expeditious resolution.68 The alternatives of increased
61. 3B J. MooRE, supra note 19, 1l 23.07(1), at 23-352-53.
62. The courts have often merged these factors, even though they are analytically
separable. See, e.g., Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 493, 495 (E.D.N.Y. 1968),
revd. on other grounds, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1970).
63. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle 8e Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562-63 (2d Cir. 1968)
(Eisen II); Rosado v. Wyman, 322 F. Supp. 1173 (S.D.N.Y.), affd. on other grounds,
437 F.2d 619 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
64. See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
65. 7 C. WRIGHT 8e A. MILLER, supra note 42, § 1769, at 654-55.
66. Cf. Mack v. General Elec. Co., 329 F. Supp. 72 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (former employee could bring action under title VII as class representative; fact that he was no
longer employed. made him a better class representative since he was both acquainted
with the defendant's practices and free from coercive influence of company management).
67. Maynard, Merel 8e Co. v. Carcioppolo, 51 F.R.D. 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
68. Fox, supra note 41, at 132, 134.
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judicial scrutiny and procedural safeguards therefore should be examined before the tentative settlement class concept is condemned.
The flexibility required for the institution of practical safeguards
is provided by rule 23(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
under which a
court may make appropriate orders ... (2) requiring, for the protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of
the action, that notice be given in such manner as the court may
direct to some or all of the members of any step in the action, or of
the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify whether they consider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, or othenvise to
come into the action; (3) imposing conditions on the representative parties or on intervenors; (4) requiring that the pleadings be
amended to eliminate therefrom allegations as to representation of
absent persons, and that the ,action proceed accordingly; (5) dealing
with similar procedural matters.
Under this rule the court could hold an evidentiary hearing prior to
the submission of notice to the tentative class on the adequacy of
representation; 69 if the representation is not adequate the class could
be restructured. 70 Alternatively, the hearing could be held prior to
the final approval of the settlement, and if the court is not satisfied
that representation is adequate it could stay approval of the settlement and allow an adjustment of the class representatives to ensure
protection of nonparty class members. 71
Perhaps the prerequisites of rule 23(a) can be satisfied by erecting
procedural safeguards. A case must also fall within one of the three
categories established by rule 23(b), however, to be maintained as a
class action. The second and third categories are potentially relevant
to civil rights litigation. Under rule 23(b)(2) the party opposing the
class must have "acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a
whole." Under rule 23(b)(3) the court must find "that the questions
of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over
any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class
action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy."
Although class actions dealing with civil rights could be maintained under rule 23 prior to its redrafting in 1966,72 there is evi69. See MANUAL, supra note 57, § 1.46, at 43.
70. See notes 46-48 supra and accompanying te....:t.
71. Basch v. Talley Indus., Inc., 53 F.R.D. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Cahn, The New
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 GEO. L.J. 1204, 1216 (1966).
72. See, e.g., Potts v. Flax, 313 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1963); Todd v. Joint Apprentice•
ship Comm. of the Steel Workers of Chicago, 223 F. Supp. 12, 16 (N.D. m. 1963),
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dence that section (b)(2) was added to the rule primarily to facilitate
the maintenance of antidiscrimination suits.73 The 1966 Advisory
Committee's Note to Revised Rule 23 construes section (b)(2) as encompassing actions in which a party is charged ·with unlawful discrimination against a class whose members are incapable of specific
enumeration.74 One court asserted that the Committee clearly "envisioned the (b)(2) class action as the preferred procedural device for
disposing of 'civil rights' cases ...." 75 Rule 23(h)(2) has been the
foundation for a great number of civil rights actions alleging race76
and sex77 discrimination, as well as the vehicle for many school78 and
housing70 desegregation suits.80
Section (b)(2), however, is limited to situations in which the final
relief sought is exclusively or predominantly injunctive or declaratory.81 Thus, a suit seeking mainly monetary damages does not
qualify under that portion of the rule. 82 Whether title VII tentative
settlement class actions fall within rule 23(b)(2) is a difficult question.
The statute authorizes courts to grant injunctions and to "order such
affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include reinstatement or hiring of employees ... with ... back pay ...." 88 The
court initially determines whether there has been unlawful disvacated as moot, 332 F.2d 243 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 914 (1965); 7A
C. WRIGHT&: A. Mll.LER, supra note 42, § 1776, at 32-35 n.64-67.
73. Cahn, supra note 71, at 1216: "Subsection (b)(2) is new. It will place into the
rule procedures now used in class actions brought to force or prevent action that
really concerns members of a class individually-cases concerning racial discrimination
••• come immediately to mind."
74. Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69, 102 (1966).
'75, Johnson v. City of Baton Rouge, 50 F.R.D. 295, 300-01 (E.D. La. 1970).
76. See, e.g., Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968).
77. See, e.g., Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 1041 (D.D.C. 1971).
78. See, e.g., Louisiana High School Athletic Assn. v. St. Augustine High School, 396
F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1968).
79. See, e.g., Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920,
937 n.42 (2d Cir. 1968).
80. There have also been a number of class actions since 1966 involving civil
rights litigation that have not been categorized in any of the three categories in subdivision (b). See, e.g., Grier v. Specialized Skills, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 856 (W.D.N.C.
1971); Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970), afld., 472 F.2d
631 (9th Cir. 1972); Wilson v. Monsanto Co., 315 F. Supp. 977 (E.D. La. 1970); Penn
v. Stumpf, 308 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
Some courts have allowed civil rights class actions under rule 23(b)(3). See, e.g.,
Mack v. General Elec. Co., 329 F. Supp. 72, 76 (E.D. Pa. 1971): Baxter v. Savannah
Sugar Ref. Corp., 46 F.R.D. 56 (S.D. Ga. 1968); Hayes v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R.
Co,, 46 F.R.D. 49 (S.D. Ga. 1968); Hardy v. U.S. Steel Corp., 289 F. Supp. 200 (N.D.
Ala. 1967).
81. 3B J. MOORE, supra note 19, 11 23.45(1) at 23-708; Amendments to Rules of
Civil Procedure, supra note 74, at 102.
82. Eisen v. Carlisle &: Jacquelin, 42 U.S.L.W. 4804 (U.S. May 28, 1974) (Eisen Ill);
Eisen v. Carlisle &: Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968) (Eisen II).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. II, 1972).
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crimination, and, if discrimination is found, an injunction is entered
and claims for monetary relief are litigated separately.84 Professor
Moore suggests that the court divide such a case and handle claims
for relief under separate sections of rule 23(b).85 Others argue that the
entire action should be allowed to proceed under section (b)(2) if injunctive relief is sought, urging that a dispute over whether an action
is primarily for injunctive or declaratory relief rather than a monetary award is a useless expenditure of energy.86 Courts have generally
allowed title VII suits to proceed under section (b)(2).
Title VII tentative settlement class actions should also be valid
under rule 23(b)(3). The drafters created section (b)(3) as a broad
residual category to cover cases in which factors of convenience and
efficiency mandate the use of the class action: "Subdivision (b)(3)
encompasses those cases in which a class action would achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural
fairness or bringing about other undesirable results." 87 The major
advantage of a TSC-its ability to encourage and expedite settlement88-probably makes it "superior to other available methods for
the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy," as rule 23(b)(3)
requires.
A TSC action under title VII thus falls within rule 23(b)(2) as a
civil rights action asking for injunctive or declaratory relief and
·within rule 23(b)(3) as an action offering convenience and finality.
Section (b)(2) is normally preferred when both (b)(2) and (b)(3) may
be used. Under (b)(3), members of the class may exclude themselves
from the proceeding, and thereby avoid being bound by a judgment
against the remaining members of the class; 89 no such option exists
84. See, e.g., Jamison v. Olga Coal Co., 335 F. Supp. 454 (S.D. W. Va, 1971) (race
discrimination); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 1041 (D.D.C. 1971)
(sex: discrimination); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 319 F. Supp. 835 (M,D.N.C. 1970),
atfd. in part, revd. in part on other grounds, 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971), cert, denied,
404 U.S. 1007 (1972). See also Johnson v. Goodyear Tire &: Rubber Co., 491 F.2d
1364 (5th Cir. 1974).
85. 3B J. MOORE, supra note 19, ,r 23.45(1), at 23-708-09.
86. 7A C. WRIGHT &: A. Mu.I.ER, supra note 42, § 1775, at 23.
87. 3B J. MOORE, supra note 19, 1J 23.45(1), at 23-710.
88. See text following note 27 supra.
89. Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 259 F. Supp. 125, 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). FED, R. C1v.
P. 23(c)(2) directs that notice be given to members of a (b)(3) class advising each
member that he may exclude himself from the class.
The plumbing fixture cases (see text accompanying notes 1-5 supra), employing
a tentative settlement class, were held to be within the provisions of (b)(3). Philadcl•
phia Housing Authority v. American Radiator 8: Standard Sanitary Corp., 323 F, Supp.
364, 373 (E.D. Pa. 1970). Although the court never specifically categorized the action,
the grant of the right to opt out of the plaintiff class indicates a (b)(3) action. The
plumbing fixture cases, however, were private treble damage antitrust actions, which
are normally brought under (b)(3), 3B J. MooRE, supra note 19, ,r 23,45(2), at 23758-59. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the tentative settlement class concept itself
is well suited to the justifications of (b)(3).
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under (b)(2).90 It is feared that allowing a suit qualifying under both
(b)(2) and (b)(3) to be considered a (b)(3) action "would permit the
institution of a separate litigation, thus unduly burdening the judicial system" 91 and defeating the policy of rules 23(b)(l) and (b)(2).92
The tendency of tentative settlement classes to be exceptionally
broad, however, may justify allowing the use of section (b)(3)'s opting
out provision. The question of adequate representation93 is less
troublesome if individual plaintiffs are allowed to withdraw from the
settlement class after receiving notice. Thus, unless fair representation can be guaranteed by court supervision, perhaps the TSC action
should be categorized under section (b)(3).
The disadvantage of allowing the use of the opt out provision of
rule 23(b)(3) is that withdrawals may significantly diminish the employer-defendant's incentive for initiating TSC negotiations; the resulting settlement might not entirely resolve all present and future
claims based on the defendant's past conduct. It may be, however,
that in most actions withdrawals would be few, and the employerdefendant would remain with a settlement incentive. Also, a court
that finds that all class members are adequately represented or that
withdrawals would be numerous probably could decide to rely on
section (b)(2) instead of (b)(3), and prohibit withdrawals.
Since the creation of a tentative settlement class postpones a final
class determination until court approval of the settlement, the
question arises whether such a delay is permissible under rule 23
(c)(l), which provides, in part: "As soon as practicable after the
commencement of an action brought as a class action, the court shall
determine by order whether it is to be so maintained."
The legislative history of the phrase "as soon as practicable," like
the phrase itself, is ambiguous. It can be argued that the draftsmen of
rule 23 did not intend to require a class determination immediately
after suit is filed. The 1964 Preliminary Draft of the Proposed
Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States
District Courts stated that whether a class action may be maintained
must be determined "[a]s soon as practicable ... and before the decision on the merits .•.." 94 Perhaps the decision to delete the latter
phrase in the final draft95 should be interpreted as requiring a more
90. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(3).
91. Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 259 F. Supp. 125, 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
92. Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., ~9 F. Supp. 125, 130-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); 3B
J. MooRE, supra note 19, ,i 21.31(3).
93. See text accompanying notes 57-67 supra.
94. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of
the United States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil
Procedure for the United States District Courts, 34 F.R.D. 325, 386 (1964) (emphasis
added).
95. On March 12, 1965, the Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of the
Judicial Conference of the Ninth Circuit rejected a preliminary draft of the proposed rules that contained the phrase "before the decision on the merits." Committee
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expedient determination. However, one commentator argues that
the elimination of the phrase was intended to allow courts greater
latitude, giving them authority to grant class relief even after a decision on the merits in an individual suit.96 Under this reading the
delay in class determination necessitated by the creation of a tentative settlement class would certainly be permissible.
Furthermore, the last sentence in rule 23(c)(l), which states that
"an order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be
altered or amended before the decision on the merits," indicates
that later reconsideration or alteration of class determination is
clearly permissible. 97 As one district court noted, a decision regarding
class determination "is not irreversible; should any new matter arise
which suggest [sic] the need to reconsider [such a] decision, the Court
will not hesitate to utilize its power under Rule 23(c)(l)." 118
One court, however, has stated that "as soon as practicable" contemplates determination of class action status promptly after the filing of an action,99 and another court has observed that current
practice calls for the determination of the maintainability of a class
action and the structuring and identification of the class to be made
"at the earliest pragmatically wise moment."100 One commentator
notes that by local court rule some districts require determination to
be made within sixty or ninety days of the filing of the complaint.101
The Manual for Complex Litigation states that there are sound
and urgent practical considerations that call for early class determination.102 Persons who think that they are represented in a proposed
class action may fail to make a claim for relief until the statute of
limitations has run: 103 "[M]embers of a putative plaintiff class may be
on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Judicial Conference-Ninth Circuit, Supple•
mental Report, 37 F.R.D. 71, 71 (1965). On June 21, 1965, the Committee again re•
jected the preliminary draft but noted certain improvements over the draft of March
12, including the deletion of the phrase. Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procc•
dure, Judicial Conference-Ninth Circuit, Second Supplemental Report, 37 F.R,D,
499, 500, 522 (1965).
96. Note, Title VII and Postjudgment Class Actions, 47 IND. L.J. 350 (1972),
97. See, e.g., Alameda Oil Co. v. Ideal Basic Indus., Inc., 326 F. Supp. 98, 105
(D. Colo. 1971); Cusick v. N.V. Nederlandsche Combinatie Voor Chemische Industrie,
317 F. Supp. 1022, 1026 (E.D. Pa, 1970).
98. Weisman v. MCA Inc., 45 F.R.D. 258, 265 (D. Del. 1968).
99. Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 42 F.R.D. 324, 326 (E.D. Pa,
1967). In that case, however, counsel for the defendants requested leave to file affidavits
and briefs, requested additional discovery, and sought to prevent oral argument before
the class determination; the court viewed the question as likely to remain open for at
least two or three additional months. 42 F.R.D. at 325,
100. Berman v. Narragansett Racing Assn., 48 F.R.D. 333, 336 (D.R.I. 1969).
101. Dobbin, Settlement of Private Antitrust Litigation Including Class Type
Actions and Multiple Defendant Lawsuits, 34 Omo ST. L.J. 513, 520 (1973).
102. MANuAL, supra note 57, § 1.40, at 18,
103. MANUAL, supra note 57, § 1.40, at 18-19.
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led by the very existence of the lawsuit to neglect their rights until
after a negative ruling on [the existence of a class action]-by which
time it may be too late for the filing of independent actions."104
The problem is especially troublesome with regard to the TSC.
The initial attempt to represent an unusually broad class of plaintiffs, the increased delay in class determination, and the possibility
that the court will not approve the compromise-thereby necessitating a de novo determination of the proper class-magnify the danger
that some plaintiffs will be excluded from the class after the statute
of limitations has expired.
There are three methods of ameliorating the problem. First, one
federal judge has suggested that in cases in which the court denies
the"existence of a class action subsequent to the expiration of an applicable statute of limitations, the denial may, under the provision of
rule 23(c) permitting conditional orders, be conditioned on the tolling of the statute for passive members of the disbanded class.105 The
propriety of such an action is not settled,106 however, and one court
has argued that the retroactive tolling of the statute of limitations
should depend upon the reason for the dismissal of the class action
allegation.107 A better solution would be for the court to condition
initial approval of a TSC upon the inclusion of a term in the agreement that binds the defendants to waive the statute of limitations in
the event that the settlement is not consummated.108
The doctrine of equitable estoppel presents a second method of
protecting the plaintiff. It has been held that a defendant is estopped
104. Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D.
39, 40 {196'1).
105. MANUAL, supra note 57, § 1.40, at 19 n.21.
106. 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 42, § 1795, at 222: "However, it is not
at all settled that a negative determination of the class action question should relate
back [for purposes of the statute of limitations]."
107. Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 461 (E.D.
Pa. 1968):
If the reason for the negative determination is failure to meet the prerequisites
of 23(a) or even if the reason is that the common questions do not predominate
over mdividual questions under 23(b)(3) it would seem reasonable to conclude
that such negative determination also relates back to the filing of the complaint.
If there never really was a class to be represented, members of the purported
class can scarcely be heard to claim that they started suit, vicariously, before the
limitations period expired. But if the reason for the negative determination
stems from a weighing of various considerations of judicial housekeeping, it may
well be that the decision should not relate back to the commencement of the
action, and that at the very least, an opportunity should be presented for proof
of reliance upon the pendency of the purported class action sufficient to toll the
statute of limitations. Any other approach would make it virtually mandatory
for every class member to file a cautionary separate action within the limitations
period.
108. Authority for conditional class determination orders is vested in the courts
by FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(l), and it is well established that, in the absence of statutory
prohibition, the statute of limitations defense may be waived. See, e.g., Allen v.
Smith, 129 U.S. 465 (1889); Finn v. United States, 123 U.S. 227 (1887); In re Smith's
Estate, 240 Iowa 499, 505, 36 N.W.2d 815, 825 (1949).
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from resorting to a plea of limitations if the plaintiff was led not to
sue by the defendant's mvn actions.100 Generally the type of conduct
that is sufficient to give rise to an estoppel raises a question of fact; 110
the defendant must have done something that affirmatively induced
the plaintiff to delay his action. 111 Deception or bad faith is involved
in the usual case,112 but the unique status of the TSC arguably justifies extending the doctrine. The TSC action would probably be initiated by the employer-defendant. The initiation of suit and the defendant's subsequent negotiations might be affirmative acts that lull
the plaintiff into a sense of security and cause him to forego filing
suit. Moreover, the purpose of the statute of limitations will not be
subverted by tolling its application in the TSC case. Limitation
statutes are primarily designed to promote justice by preventing the
surprise that may occur when claims are suddenly revived by dilatory
plaintiffs long after pertinent "evidence has been lost, memories have
faded, and witnesses have disappeared." 113 Surprise is not a factor in
TSC cases, however. An action based on the conduct in controversy
will have been instituted before the period of limitations expires.
Defendants are thus made aware of the nature of the evidence that
will be needed at trial, and, since the ac.tion is brought on behalf of
all others similarly situated, the defendants have notice of the extent
to which there are claims against them. The equities thus call for
the application of the estoppel doctrine.
The third method of dealing with the problem is to ignore it. An
examination of the judicial attitude toward class actions in the employment discrimination area reveals that some courts show little
concern for the protection of the interests of absentee class members
who are ultimately excluded after the statute of limitations has run.
The limitations problem may simply be insufficient to require early
determination of the class.
For example, in Curry v. La-Z-Boy South, Inc., 114 the court specifically postponed defining the class in order to see how the plaintiff
would develop her class at an evidentiary hearing. Although the
statute of limitations problem was present the court ignored it and
109. See, e.g., State v. Hart Motor Express, Inc., 270 Minn. 24, 29, 132 N.W.2d 391,
394 (1964); Kyle v. Green Acres at Verona, Inc., 44 N.J. 100, 107, 207 A.2d 513, 519
(1965).
110. See, e.g., Staats v. Rural Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 271 Wis. 543, 545, 74 N.W,2d
152, 154 (1956).
Ill. See, e.g., Safeway Stores, Inc., v. Wilson, 190 Kan. 7, 11, 372 P.2d 551, 551,
(1962).
112. See, e.g., Industrial Indem. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm., 115 Cal. App. 2d
684, 687, 252 P.2d 649, 651 (1953); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Wilson, 190 Kan. 7, 12, 372
P.2d 551, 555 (1962).
113. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342,
348-49 (1944).
114. 4 CCH EMPL. PRAC. DEC. ~ 7734 (S.D. Miss. 1972).
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dealt primarily with standing and scope of representation as opposed
to the timing of class determination.115 Similarly, the court in Wilson
v. Monsanto Co.116 ruled that the plaintiff had the right to represent
• all members of a general undefined class until discovery and an
evidentiary hearing would permit "more precise pleadings, enabling
the ... Court to equate and balance what the [plaintiff] claims are
the limits of the class against the tests of adequate representation,
protection of the interests of the class, and manageability of the
lawsuit." 117 Again the court ignored the possible foreclosure of the
rights of persons who think they are represented as part of the class.118
The approach in these cases seems to be a unwritten balancing of
the statute of limitations problem against the interests served by
delaying class determination. The use of the tentative settlement
class in title VII actions vindicates public as well as private interests;
individual plaintiffs who represent class interests are "private attorney generals." 119 The interests of excluded plaintiffs may thus be
ounveighed by the overriding public interest in the maintenance and
settlement of class action suits.
This argument, however, and indeed the entire argument for the
use of the TSC, assumes that the device will lead to fair and just
settlements. The basic test for judging a compromise is a comparison
of the terms of the compromise witli the likely rewards of litigation,120 but this comparison is very difficult in the tentative settlement
class context. There is usually little or no discovery prior to the class
action determination,121 and in the absence of information relevant
to liability, damages, and the expenses of trial and preparation for
trial it may be impossible to determine if the proposed compromise
indeed correlates with the economic reality of the case.122 Some argue
that rights are much more likely to be protected when a court certifies the class determination by resolving necessary factual issues and
analyzing important economic data before the settlement is negotiated.123 In tentative settlement class actions a court could defer settle115. 4 CCH EMPL. PRAc. DEC. 1J 7734, at 5843-44.
116. 315 F. Supp. 977 (E.D. La. 1970).
117. 315 F. Supp. at 979, quoting Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417
F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir. 1969) (Godbold, J., concurring).
118. See also Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Radiator &: Standard
Sanitary Corp., 323 F. Supp. 364, 373: "There is no mandatory requirement in Rule 23
that in every case the class determination must be made first before any settlement
negotiations are undertaken."
119. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 401-02 (1968).
120. MANUAL, supra note 57, § 1.46, at 44.
121. McGough &: Lerach, Termination of Class Action: The Judicial Rule, 33
U. Prrr. L. REv. 445, 457 (1972) (suggesting that the court could order full discovery
prior to approving the settlement).
122. MANUAL, supra note 57, § 1.46, at 44.
123. Id. at 45.
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ment approval until after discovery or other exchange of information
was made to aid the court in defining the class and formulating the
notice contemplated under rule 23(e).124 It may be impossible for the
court ever to assess the merits of a case accurately, however, and the
settlement itself may best reflect the parties' evaluation of the actual
merits of the case.1 25
Use of the tentative settlement class may facilitate easy, quick,
and relatively inexpensive settlements of title VII suits. It may also
increase the likelihood that some plaintiffs with valid claims will
recover even though their proof of datnage or theory of liability
would not have been sufficient to justify an individual suit. However,
these advantages must be balanced against the potential abuse of
the technique. The TSC may encourage unwarranted claims120 or
the harassment and coercion of legitimate businesses with the
threat of destructive publicity and expensive suits.127 Furthermore,
the breadth of the tentative class may make adequate class representation difficult. The advantages and disadvantages of the TSC are difficult to assess without practical experience, however. An experimental and closely supervised use of the TSC should be undertaken
to ascertain its value.
·
124. See Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda .Aru. Brass Co., 42 F.R.D. 324 (E.D.
Pa. 1967).
125. Fox, supra note 41, at 142.
126. See Hearings on s. 984, S. 1222, S. 1378 Before the Consumer Subcomm. of
the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 92-20, at 145 (1071) (testiof Commerce).
127. Id. at 169-70 (testimony of Thomas Nichol, Jr., general counsel of Gas
mony of Irving Scher, member of the Consumer Issues Committee of the U.S. Chamber
Appliance Manufacturers Association).

